October 19, 1962

October 19, 1962

Tape 31.2, October 19, 9:45 am: JFK discusses various military options and possible consequences with the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Joint Chiefs chairman General Maxwell Taylor states that the JCS was initially agreed on military action (air strike) along with the blockade. But, he expresses concern about the political impact especially on our alliances, while admitting that all the sites would probably not be destroyed [1:50].

JFK concludes that an air strike would give the USSR "a clear line" to take Berlin - the way they took Hungary after the 1956 Suez invasion. [3:30] He states that our allies would think of us as "trigger-happy Americans" who lost Berlin because we did not have the guts to endure the situation in Cuba. Cuba is 5 to 6,000 miles from Europe he argues, and "they don't give a damn about it... This is a very satisfactory position from their point of view." [4:10]

JFK states that an air strike would neutralize the missiles but would likely force the USSR to take Berlin "which leaves me only one afternative which is to fire nuclear weapons - which is a hell of an afternative - to begin a nuclear exchange." [5:15] "I don't think we have any satisfactory alternatives," JFK concludes, because the problem is not just Cuba but Berlin. If it were only Cuba it would be easy: "But if we do nothing, we will have problems in Berlin anyway. So, we have to do something." [6:50]

Air Force chief of staff General Curtis LeMay, argues forcefully that the blockade and the political talks without accompanying military action will lead to war. He concludes that the Soviets won't take Berlin if we act in Cuba but will take it if we fail to act [8:30]. "This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich.... I just don't see any other solution except direct military intervention right now." [9:30]

JFK cites the fact that nations automatically expel diplomats if their own diplomats are expelled and concludes that if we take military action the USSR will have to as weIl. [10:25]

Several members of the JCS argue for military action and express fears that the blockade alone is a weak response which could lead to nuclear blackmail. [14:25] [Source: JFK Library release notes prepared by Sheldon M. Stern]

Saturday, October 20: Under the public guise of an "upper respiratory infection," President Kennedy returns to Washington from Chicago after being convinced by Robert Kennedy that he must meet again with EX-COMM to discuss, among other things, the discovery of additional Soviet missiles in Cuba.

Sunday, October 21: After learning that an air strike against the missile sites could result in 10-20 thousand casualties, and that another U-2 flight discovered bombers and cruise missile sites along Cuba's northern shores, President Kennedy decides on a naval blockade of Cuba. When confronted with questions regarding rumors of offensive weapons in Cuba, Kennedy asks the press not to report the story until after he address the American public.

Monday, October 22: Despite being urged by Senate leaders to call for air strikes, President Kennedy addresses the American public and announces his resolve to implement naval blockade only. U.S. military alert is set at DEFCON 3 and Castro mobilizes all of Cuba's military forces.

Tuesday, October 23: The Organization of American States unanimously supports the U.S. decision to quarantine Cuba and, by the end of the day, all naval vessels are in place. Stunning reconnaissance photos reveal that Soviet missiles are poised for launch.